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God’s Co-workers: Rémi 
Brague’s Treatment of the
 Divine Law in Christianity
The Law of God: The Philosophical History of an Idea by Rémi 
Brague, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2007) (LG)
We live in an imprudent age. It is not simply that modern times have witnessed some of the worst horrors of human history. 
Rather, we have diffi culty understanding what prudence means. 
We generally think of prudence as cunning, or better, as that intel-
lectual faculty that enables us to make exceptions to general rules 
when those general rules, regrettably, do not obtain in every situ-
ation. We think this way because we think of social reality, and 
nature (when it so moves us), as acting according to general, well-
regulated norms of repetitive and predictable behavior.1 
Our imprudence is related to our confusion about the nature of 
law, which, as Rémi Brague demonstrates in his The Law of God: 
The Philosophical History of an Idea, derives from the modern re-
jection of certain presuppositions of divine law found among the 
three Abrahamic traditions, especially in the understandings ex-
pressed during the Middle Ages. Central to our confusion is the 
way modern assumptions fracture law from counsel and turn it into 
a form of command. According to Brague, law and counsel are uni-
fi ed in the medieval Jewish, Islamic, and Christian minds because 
law, as a “dictate of reason” (Aquinas) directing human beings to 
the good, takes the form of counsel out of what is owed to human 
beings as rational creatures. In modernity, law and counsel are dis-
connected from the good, as is fi tting for beings whose reason is 
now seen as instrumental. Instead of law and counsel being united, 
counsel became self-interested cunning, and law became com-
mand. The subtle reasoning behind the extrinsic nature of the law 
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and its movement upon the human intellect and will found among 
the medieval thinkers was spliced into Machiavellian cunning that 
needs to be controlled by the strong sovereign who stands above 
the realm and exerts his will upon it.2
Brague’s account of divine law is not merely an historical re-
capitulation of an old, quaint, and outdated idea. Moreover, in 
showing that divine law implies a “separation of church and state,” 
Brague does more than describe the historical predecessors to our 
contemporary liberal arrangements. Instead, Brague’s account, 
while overly compressed in some instances, enables us to gain clar-
ity about the impasse we experience in our contemporary political 
orders, and to think of ways of moving beyond that impasse. Ac-
cording to his diagnosis, our modern impasse concerning the na-
ture of law is fragmentation between law and counsel, which means 
that we are confused about 1) the good the law intends and 2) the 
means of fulfi lling it. In examining the idea of divine law, Brague 
enables the reader to gain clarity not only about the meaning of 
“divine law” but also the nature of law per se, because he dem-
onstrates how reasoning about the divine law requires reasoning 
about what stands above law.3 For instance, in Christianity (e.g., 
Thomism) divine law stands above and separate from natural law 
as well as human law. Human law must conform to natural law, and 
divine law strives for something higher than natural law. In striving 
for something higher than natural law, the reader of Brague’s work 
is forced to consider whether one can still speak of “law” at all, or at 
least the common sense understanding of law which seems to be a 
rule or norm that describes “a constant relation among phenomena” 
(LG, 236) in recognizable and typical situations and events.4
The advantage of examining Brague’s treatment of divine law 
in Christianity, and elaborating on its implications, lies precisely in 
the clarity of Christianity’s claim that, in fulfi lling the law, it clari-
fi es the nature not only of divine law but also of law per se. More-
over, Christianity claims to “solve” the tension between law and 
counsel by equating the two.5 This equation is implicit in Brague’s 
historical coverage of “church-state relations” in medieval Christi-
anity in Chapter 9 of The Law of God. It is seen more clearly in his 
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treatment of St. Thomas Aquinas in Chapter 13. Our analysis of his 
treatment of Christianity, as well as our explication of its principles, 
will focus on these two aspects.
Brague reminds the reader that, in the Christian tradition, law 
does not at all refer to norms or commands. Rather, “law” must 
be understood in terms of prudence (providentia), which is about 
knowing individuals in their particularity. Our consideration of law 
as intending the good of things in general gets refi ned into a consid-
eration of providentia that intends the goods of individuals. How-
ever, can providentia, which is individual knowledge, be reconciled 
with a view of law that groups individuals under a general norm? 
Whither law? Is Christianity’s replacement of the Old Law with the 
New Law actually a misnomer? Are the symbols, “New Law,” or 
“law of Christ,” or “law of liberty” in fact terms mistaken for some-
thing else? Are they ironic nods to the predecessors of Christian 
order, Judaism and Stoicism? Or, as Eric Voegelin has argued, must 
Christianity, which represents a differentiation of consciousness of 
reality, necessarily draw upon its antecedent more compact cultural 
and spiritual symbols to articulate itself?6 Christianity, as Brague 
shows, is the revelation of a person, not law. But Christianity and 
its teachings still exist in the world and draw upon our experiences 
of the world, including the cosmos, to communicate its meaning.7 
Chief among the world’s symbols is the affi rmation of the created 
order (to be redeemed) that expresses itself as the lastingness and 
endurance of the cosmos, though man’s earliest experience of law 
was as decisions and punishments, that is, of what we might call 
law’s instantiations (LG, 11–4).8 Law as a norm refl ects the cosmos 
in its lastingness and its governance over human beings. Yet, man’s 
purpose in Christianity transcends the cosmos, just as it transcends 
the articulation (though not the substance) of divine law. In Chris-
tianity, then, one may surmise that “divine law” constitutes a neces-
sary compromise, and one that is necessarily meaningful, with the 
saeculum.
Christian Scripture
To speak of divine law within Christianity is to evoke something 
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ambiguous, to say the least. Brague observes that while “the law of 
Christ” (ennomos Christou) became a commonplace among Chris-
tian thinkers, it was actually “an isolated turn of phrase” for Paul (1 
Cor. 9:21; LG, 92 & 210). Christianity does not produce a law in the 
same sense as found in either Judaism or Islam. Rather, Christian-
ity introduces a person while keeping the content of the law more or 
less the same as in Judaism. Action remains more or less the same, 
meaning Christian “law” changes little. Even so, the change in pur-
pose and means of obtaining the goal of action undergo revolution-
ary change, “The Christian reinterpretation of the commandments 
affects their context, not their content” (LG, 69). The paradox of 
Christian “law” is that the revelation of Christ changes nothing in 
one sense and everything in another sense. Near the end of the 
book, Brague reformulates a statement of Benjamin Constant that 
Christianity’s morality is “common morality” while also “ennobl[ing] 
all the virtues” (LG, 259–60). The direction Brague takes with this 
reformulation requires refi nement, which will be considered below 
when we discuss Thomas Aquinas.
With Christ, the end of law is friendship with God (John 15:15; 
LG, 225). This makes law superfl uous as an extrinsic cause of virtue, 
as now human beings are “God’s co-creators” (1 Cor. 3:9). No longer 
disciples, human beings are no longer subjects whose nature it is to 
be under law as is the case with Judaism. Brague concentrates on 
two innovations concerning human anthropology that Christianity 
introduces and that provide the substructure for humans’ ability to 
share friendship with God: conscience and autonomy (LG, 88–90). 
Paul draws upon Stoicism to symbolize the “holy spirit [that] in-
dwells within us, one who marks our good and bad deeds and is 
our guardian” (LG, 88)9 The upshot of this is that good and evil 
are simultaneously available to all, as Gentiles now have access to 
knowledge of the law. The problem now resides in whether we can 
will the good. Conscience (syneidesis) enlightens us about what we 
should do, but it requires the work of the Holy Spirit to give it ef-
fect. Paul also adapts autonomos in a manner consistent with one 
of Aristotle’s usages: the Gentiles who have the law written upon 
their heart “are themselves a law.”10 The actions of certain individu-
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als are themselves a form of law. Christianity then teaches that the 
content of the law is open to all human beings. It also teaches that 
a few can become autonomous, those “co-creators” or virtuosi who 
embody the law and for whom the good is what “he possesses on 
his own.”11 
In revealing the divine law as a person, whereby Christ is con-
sistently referred to as the law instead of as the lawgiver, Christian-
ity purports to surpass Judaism and Islam in its understanding of 
the divine law and the possibility of our realization of it. In order 
to make good on its claim, Christianity needs to address an im-
passe found in both Judaism and Islam. In those other Abrahamic 
faiths, divine law is revealed by the legislator. The law is meant to 
coordinate relations among people: the covenant for the Jews and 
the umma for Muslims. However, the perfection of the law, or its 
perfect embodiment, the legislator (frequently identifi ed as a phi-
losopher, in the case of Maimonides for the Jews and al-Farabi for 
the Muslims) is solitary (LG, 198). The fulfi llment of human happi-
ness, the sociability of human beings, is strangely denied in its per-
fection. In identifying Christ with the law, instead of the lawgiver, 
Christianity seems to bypass this impasse. Co-creators are friends 
with God and friends with one another. Their inherent sociabil-
ity is perfected because either they share in human perfection or 
they are denied the form of perfection ascribed to the Jewish and 
Muslim legislators insofar as only Christ is law. Moreover, the co-
creators are denied that form of perfection because there is nothing 
to legislate in Christianity. Christianity takes what is written upon 
the human heart, but in revealing the law as person, it prescribes 
the way of fulfi lling the law. Even so, only those infused with the 
Holy Spirit “are themselves a law.” Has Christianity delivered on its 
promise of reconciling law and counsel? 
Practical Origins of Separation of Church and State?
As noted above, Brague argues that Christianity deepens and el-
evates the common culture. In medieval Europe, this common cul-
ture was the inheritance of Rome, where “popes and emperors both 
claimed to be their heirs to the city of Rome” (LG, 134). The Latin 
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Middle Ages are also purportedly the source where the freedom of 
Christians worked itself out in practical terms, thereby allowing a 
separation of church and state that not only preceded the modern 
separation, but also without the problems associated with modern 
understandings of law, divine or otherwise.
Brague’s treatment of politics in the Middle Ages in Chapter 
9 is in fact the most historical of any of the chapters in the books. 
That is, this chapter focuses more on the practical engagement be-
tween “church” and “state” than on the theories that sustain their 
positions and in such a way that differs from his treatment of Ju-
daism and Islam. This is not to say that there is no principle to 
examine. Quite the contrary. With Christianity, one fi nds not nec-
essarily a political recipe for rulers to follow. Rather, one fi nds an 
expanded public arrangement, that transcends the political, and to 
which political and ecclesiastical actors appeal, the “new regime of 
salvation” (LG, 211). As a result, it is misleading to claim that “sepa-
ration of church and state” preceded the modern liberal democratic 
separation because the modern one rejects the basis upon which 
the medieval version was based. Brague summarizes the medieval 
arrangement:
In the Middle Ages, unlike what has seemed totally obvi-
ous from modern times to today, the game was not played 
between the church and the state. Instead, Christianity was 
stretched between two poles that both—fi rst the papacy, then 
the empire, following in its traces—attempted to crystallize 
into a state. That movement ended up forming the church as 
we know it today and, in reaction to it, the fi rst incarnations 
of the modern state. This combat took place on the level of 
the law, which each of the two adversaries sought to articulate 
around the divine to its own advantage (LG, 136).
The medieval “separation” was in fact two poles along a single con-
tinuum that expressed the substance of the community, but one 
whereby that substance could enable political and ecclesiastical ac-
tors to trace the limits of the law, thereby preserving the realm of 
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human liberty that law does not regulate (LG, 144). Eric Voegelin, 
referring to this civilizational continuum as sacrum imperium, pro-
vides a succinct formulation of the problem, “universal empire as a 
power organization and the universal spiritual community tended 
toward each other and fi nally met, but they did not amalgamate.”12 
The sacrum imperium was an ideal only; it never existed in fact. A 
closer look at the issues explains why.
Brague’s treatment of medieval history summarizes signifi cant 
practical judgments made by fi gures who, usually unintentionally, 
maintained the integrity of that continuum. For example, Brague 
observes that canon law contrasts with the laws of Judaism and 
Islam by preserving the space for human beings to exercise their 
practical judgment through legislation. Canon law is not founded 
upon:
Christianity’s fundamental sources . . . Consequently, it does 
not put into operation an exegetic method comparable to 
those of Judaism and Islam. Islamic ‘theocracy,’ as the direct 
power of the legislator-God, always runs the risk of short-cir-
cuiting human mediation. Conversely, Christian ‘hierocracy,’ 
which delivers legislation over to the priest, makes the inter-
mediary of a human law necessary” (LG, 145). It seems the 
Latin West contained within it the insistence that individuals 
and statesmen in particular, possess freedom to exercise ph-
ronesis, to make laws that could be genuinely ascribed to hu-
man judgment. It is noteworthy that the one great exception 
to this freedom, the encyclical of Pope Boniface VIII, Unam 
Sanctam, that “most extreme expression of the claims of the 
Holy See, formed his conception of the role of the pope by 
taking inspiration from the theory of the caliph developed by 
Avicenna.13
Brague describes the history of the Latin West as a series of ad-
justments and contestations between the two poles of the Gelasian 
two swords, papacy and empire. Both sides claimed to represent the 
“city of Rome” in its universality, and both sides claimed sacrality. 
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Signifi cantly, the empire justifi ed its sacred status not by appealing 
to Scripture, but Roman jurisprudence, as in the case of Frederick 
Barbarossa (LG, 139). Concerning the latter, Brague lists various 
sacraments and charisms imputed to the offi ces of various kings, 
including the examples of French kings miraculously healing cases 
of scrofula (a type of tuberculosis that attacks the lymph nodes) 
after being crowned (LG, 140). The effect of both sides—papacy 
and empire—laying claim on sacrality is to cancel one another out. 
In fact, Brague observes how considering this scheme as dualis-
tic is too simplistic: “The presence of the papacy and its increased 
power imposed some constraints particular to the West. Three 
forces contended for control: the pope; local ecclesiastical institu-
tions, divided into the secular clergy (the bishops) and the regular 
clergy (the monastic orders); and the temporal power, where there 
were also divisions among local sovereigns and between the latter 
and the emperor. This opened the way to a many-sided confl ict in 
which the various forces formed alliances with one another” (LG, 
134). Brague adds that the pan-European Cluniac monasteries and 
the universities played a crucial role for the papacy in countering 
imperial and local power.
In defending libertas (LG, 135), each actor essentially de-
fended his own turf. In Brague’s account, no individual actor (or 
alliance of actors) sought libertas as an ideal or sought to limit the 
claims of politics or the church. Rather, the competing actors in this 
“multipolar” world inadvertently created, or perpetuated, a world 
in which political and ecclesiastical claims had to be restrained 
because someone else would object. The intermediaries of human 
law and practical judgment were necessary to regulate these claims 
because the playing fi eld was crowded. Yet, these actors played on 
a fi eld that made these human intermediaries possible, and even 
fostered them. Stated differently: in defending his own turf, each 
actor acknowledged the legitimacy of the other actor(s) to defend 
his own turf. They all agreed no single institution could take “own-
ership” of the entire political realm, as was the case, for instance, of 
the ancient polis or Roman empire with their civil religions.14
Three characteristics of the Christian West require clarifi ca-
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tion in order to understand what gave room to these human inter-
mediaries. For the fi rst, we need to return to Paul’s Epistles, which 
show the adaptation of the perfection of the Christian community 
in the Holy Spirit to the imperfect world. Central to the Christian 
community is its continual prudential adjustments to the imperfect 
world. According to Eric Voegelin, “the greatness of Paul lies in his 
quality as a statesman that enables him . . . to transpose the com-
munity of the perfect with Christ into an idea that took into account 
the practical problems of a community that did not at all consist of 
perfect saints.”15 As a result, the exercise of phronesis, whose Pau-
line exercise Voegelin refers to as the “compromises of Paul,” is built 
into the Christian idea of divine law. Voegelin lists fi ve such “com-
promises” that underwrite the adjustments: 1) with history, combin-
ing the appearance of the Messiah, the Israelite Law, and the law of 
the Gentiles as revealed through creation; 2) with the weakness of 
man, which prompted Paul to speak of the unique gifts or charisma 
of individual members in the corpus mysticum (Ephesians 4:4–7). 
Signifi cantly, the diversifi cation of the charismata promoted equal-
ity and therefore contributed to preserving Christian neighborli-
ness; 3) the law of love maintains the contents of the Israelite law 
but revolutionizes its content; 4) eschatological indifference to so-
cial problems, such as taking slavery for granted (1 Timothy 6), de-
spite the glaring gap between the perfect spiritual brotherhood and 
real-world conditions; and 5) governmental authority is ordained 
by God (Romans 13:1), which is not a rule envisaging a permanent 
establishment, “but as a provisional arrangement that is necessi-
tated by the coexistence of the invisible realm and the world until, 
with the second coming of Christ, the tension between the two is 
resolved into the visible supernatural glory of the kingdom of God 
(2 Thessalonians 2).” However, political rule is not listed among the 
charismata of the corpus mysticum, which explains why partisans 
of the empire frequently tried to sacralize kingship on the basis of 
Roman antiquity and Hebrew Scripture instead of the New Testa-
ment.16 The coronation of Charlemagne was the high point of this 
effort to reconcile Scripture to “common morality,” but the subse-
quent failure to maintain the empire made it diffi cult for rulers to 
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legitimate their rule by appealing to the charismata. Not only was 
it diffi cult to appeal to Scripture for their rule, but there were too 
many other rulers in the fi eld. The sacrum imperium was an ideal 
only, and at least part of the tension between empire and papacy 
was the result of the fact that the papacy had to compete not just 
with a single emperor, but with numerous territorial kings, as well 
as bishops asserting the rights of the national churches.
While several of these Pauline “compromises” might imply a 
kind of indifference toward “the world,” they in fact refl ect the free-
dom the divine law provides Christians in arranging their political 
and social affairs because divine law is not dictated as a norm, but 
rather as a person. Paul’s vision of the resurrected provides him the 
freedom to perform the impressive feat of ecclesiastical “statesman-
ship” in founding the community. Crucially, what this means is that 
neither pole of the Gelasian “theio-political” spectrum can fully 
absorb or represent the Christian person. It seems the Incarnation 
of divine law as a person, expressed in terms of Pauline statesman-
ship and “compromise” here, introduces into the saeculum the idea 
of permanent reformation, if not to say revolution, whereby no insti-
tution—political/imperial and ecclesiastical—can fully absorb the 
human personality, which, as the recipient of divine gifts, lives in 
tension toward God:
 . . . the Christian idea of the person in immediacy to God 
would prove the permanent irritant against the institutions. 
The idea of the Christian person would function doubly as 
an agent of revolt against the institutionalization of the rela-
tions between the soul and God and as an agent of regenera-
tion of the institutions. . . . The public institutions of imperial 
Christianity (church and empire) have, from their beginning, 
absorbed the problems of the spiritual soul and its destiny 
into their pattern. It would seem impossible, on principle, that 
situations like the popular dissatisfaction with the empire re-
ligion of Ikhnaton, or the apolitism of the Hellenic schools, or 
the Chinese “associationalism” in confl ict with the Confucian 
public order could arise in a Christian civilization. As a matter 
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of fact, situations of this particular kind do not arise; the ten-
sions assume specifi cally different forms. For the designation 
of this specifi c difference we may appropriately use the term 
reformation. The movement of the spirit has become institu-
tionalized in the church; hence, the spiritual movements from 
the bottom of society cannot be in generic opposition to the 
institutions.17
We have found the confl ict between papacy and empire cannot be 
characterized as a confl ict between two monoliths. Moreover, we 
have traced the vitality of their confl ict to an inability of each to 
make a special claim on the human personality. This inability cre-
ates a vitality that Voegelin refers to as the permanent “reforma-
tion” that occurs within this civilization. Prompted by Brague’s sug-
gestive historical overview of medieval European political order, 
we have traced the reformation back to the vision of the human 
person expressed in the Paul’s epistles. We have seen it at work in 
the nitty-gritty of political life in the Christian Middle Ages. We 
now turn to its philosophical exposition, as Brague relates it in St. 
Thomas Aquinas.
St. Thomas Aquinas
Brague refers to St. Thomas Aquinas as one of the three “miracles” 
of the Middle Ages (along with Maimonides and Ghazali) because 
he provides the deepest philosophical exposition of the divine law 
in Christianity.18 Thomas treats divine law as counsel offered to a 
friend instead of as a commandment. As such, it takes the form of 
providence as knowledge of individuals and not as a general norm:
the intellect operates in the singular, activated by one indi-
vidual or another. There is no Man, no ‘humanity,’ but a plu-
rality of persons, all of whom are irreplaceable. Providence 
must thus reach people where they are, which is to say in their 
variety, a variety so great that the instinct common to the spe-
cies does not suffi ce to regulate it. It pertains to individuals 
within the diversity of circumstances in which they must act, 
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the complexity of which they themselves are able to grasp. 
The rational creature can grasp the reason of providence. He 
or she is thus capable of taking onto himself or herself the ex-
ercise of such a providence. The rational creature has a share 
in providence not only as object, but as subject (LG, 222).
Law is the form that providence takes in relation to a free 
being,“Thomas defi nes law as the way we act when in full posses-
sion of our freedom” (LG, 223). Law does not command, but is the 
expression of the free being. Freedom has its own logic. Thus, hu-
man beings are co-creators with God because they partake in God’s 
providence; they are friends of God, which is the end of the law. 
Brague’s equation of law with providence contains an ambigu-
ity because the usual meaning of the latter is to approach beings 
in their general way of being, and not as individuals. This is one of 
the reasons Socrates claims the superiority of dialectic over law.19 
Might Brague have overlooked some political reasons for Aquinas 
to invoke the language of law when in fact the essence of law’s aspi-
ration is in fact not law-like?20 
In order to address this impasse, a closer look at Thomas’s treat-
ment of the inner logic of divine law, in the form of the “New Law,” 
is necessary.21 One of the unusual aspects of the three questions of 
the Summa that constitute his discussion, which complete the so-
called treatise on law that precedes the treatise on grace,22 is the 
frequency with which Thomas refers to the Holy Spirit. He refers to 
it 34 times in these three questions, leading at least one commen-
tator to refer to it as one of three “zones of great pneumatological 
concentration” of the Summa.23 The concluding three articles of 
the so-called treatise on law also constitute a bridge from that trea-
tise to the treatise on grace. Both consider the extrinsic principles 
of acts, of law and of grace. Questions 106–108 on the New Law 
refl ect the transformation from law to grace. Closer inspection of 
these questions helps us to see the conversion of law from general 
principle to individuated judgment, as well as helping us to under-
stand how Aquinas avoids the antinomianism that might arise.
However, before proceeding with the New Law, it is worth-
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while to glance ahead to the treatise on grace and notice how 
Thomas treats the Holy Spirit as the person of the Trinity who be-
stows knowledge not only of matters of faith and prophecy (the light 
of grace), but also, “Every truth by whomsoever spoken is from the 
Holy Ghost as bestowing the natural light, and moving us to under-
stand and speak the truth, but not as dwelling in us by sanctifying 
grace, or as bestowing any habitual gift superadded to nature.”24 In 
the main body of the article, Thomas draws on Aristotle’s On the 
Soul (III.4) to observe how the intellectual act is a movement that 
begins with the fi rst mover that places its impress upon the intel-
lect. As Aristotle argues, “thinking is a way of being acted upon.” 25 
Thomas’s distinction between the Holy Spirit’s gifts of the light of 
grace and the natural light overturns the false dichotomy of revela-
tion and natural reason frequently attributed to him because the act 
of the intellect is experienced as a gift and therefore one of passive 
noëtic reception that precedes discursive reasoning. 26 Even so, this 
harmonious relationship of faith and reason also enables him to ac-
knowledge the rational structure of faith, thereby avoiding fi deism 
or antinomianism because Thomas can assert a rational standard 
for acts of faith. Or put more precisely: Thomas can identify the 
rational nature that inheres in genuine acts of faith.27 This ability 
will become crucial when Thomas turns his attention to address-
ing the paradox of how the New Law simultaneously maintains the 
standards of the Old Law, while maintaining that the virtuosi that 
they are a law unto themselves.
Turning back now to the New Law, we see that, as the conclud-
ing three questions of the so-called treatise on law, they elaborate 
what is already present in the previous questions on the nature of 
law and on the natural, human, and divine laws. Already in the 
objections of the fi rst question of the treatise (Q.90), Aquinas must 
grapple with the two main alternatives as to the nature of law: 
whether it pertains to reason or will. He answers that it pertains 
to reason, but he cannot dismiss the objection that it pertains to 
will because he needs to explain what moves us to act according 
to law. He excludes coercion from his defi nition of law later in that 
same question, so the attractiveness of law must reside in the good 
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it achieves. Elsewhere he writes that the “specifi c nature of law in 
fact is to arouse man to do good.”28 Law not only places the good 
before the intellect, but must appeal to the good of the individual 
the lawmaker wishes to have obey the law. Law cannot do this on 
its own, and, as we shall see, the last three questions of the so-
called treatise on law attempts to demonstrate how law must be 
understood in order to unite intellect and will, that is, to equate 
command and counsel, “to arouse man to do good.”
Also in Q. 90, Thomas avers the individuated nature of law that 
Brague notices. Thomas defi nes law as “nothing else than an or-
dinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has 
care of the community, and promulgated.”29 Law is an expression 
of reason established for a particular community “by him who has 
care of the community.” It is individuated insofar as it is tailored to 
a particular community; it is general insofar as it ignores differences 
among the multitude of individuals it governs. Aquinas expands on 
the individuation of law in the next question (Q. 91) when he ob-
serves that human reason needs to proceed from the general pre-
cepts of the natural law “to the more particular determination of 
certain matters.”30 Human law and divine law determine the natu-
ral law. Determination means more than applying general laws to 
specifi c circumstances. Thomas seems to suggest this meaning in 
two parts of Q. 95.2 when he describes human laws as determina-
tions of natural law, in the way a craftsman determines the general 
form of a house to some particular shape and when the choice of a 
particular punishment for an evil-doer is an act of determination. 
Yet, determination also means completion of something, as if the 
general form were insuffi cient. For instance, in his Commentary on 
the Nicomachean Ethics, Thomas describes determination as the 
movement from potency to act.31 In the realm of speculative reason, 
it is the resolution of a problem, or the movement from uncertainty 
to certainty.32 Determination in the realm of practical reason, then, 
is the movement of human potency to act, that is, the full activa-
tion of the virtues. In terms of the relationship among laws, it is not 
merely the application of natural law to particular circumstances, 
but, in keeping with Brague’s reminder that divine law is brought to 
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us in the mode of individuated knowledge (judgment), law-making 
itself becomes a process of seeking practical knowledge. As Robert 
Miner explains, “such that the acquisition of true knowledge about 
particulars is not anterior to the process of law-making, but is ac-
quired through the very performance of the activity.”33 Law-mak-
ing is a central part of the practical intellect that constitutes the 
“dictate of reason” that forms part of the defi nition of law. So much 
so that even though the ruler legislates, the citizens participate in 
law-making in giving or withdrawing consent. This was a crucial 
part of the Old Law that established the Israelites as a mixed re-
gime.34 
The purpose of the Old Law was to promote friendship. The 
fi rst article of Q. 105 explains how the Israelite constitution is mixed 
and in accordance with Aristotle’s understanding of the mixed con-
stitution. Thomas observes but does not comment on the fact that 
the divine law’s provision for mixed government is identical to that 
offered by Aristotle’s natural understanding. Already in Q. 100 he 
had indicated that the moral precepts belong to the law of nature.35 
In fact, his subsequent discussion of the Old Law’s provisions could 
fall under the heading of the natural law. The subsequent articles 
fi t with Brague’s observation that the divine law is not overly con-
cerned with politics, but, rather, with governing ethical relations 
in promoting friendship (a. 2), economic relations in promoting 
just exchange, the Israelites’ treatment of foreigners (a. 3), and the 
household (a. 4). In identifying the purpose of the law as the promo-
tion of friendship, Thomas identifi es the character of political soci-
ety as in accordance with the natural law, citing Cicero’s (as quoted 
by Augustine) defi nition of a commonwealth.36 The commonwealth 
as founded upon consent promotes friendship, which is to say that 
the political relationship is inferior to friendship. For instance, the 
law provides the space for the free property-owning members of 
society to exercise just exchange. The purpose of the Old Law is to 
accustom people to “give of their own to others readily.”37 He pro-
vides the example of the Old Law’s requirement that one may eat 
from another’s vineyard so long as what moderate amount he takes 
is consumed on the grounds, ensuring enough is left over for the 
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property owner. The Old Law requires people to make small sacri-
fi ces to get them accustomed to give of themselves in friendship.
The transition from Q. 105 on the judicial precepts of the Old 
Law to Q. 106 on the New Law jars the reader’s attention because 
of its radical shift of focus. Q. 105 ends with a detailed discussion of 
ethical obligations within the household, while Q. 106 must carry 
the load of introducing the reader to the enormity of the Incarna-
tion. Questions 106-108 document the conversion of the soul from 
the letter of the law to its spirit, from the written law to the law of 
the heart. Thomas’s task is challenging because he needs to explain 
the revolutionary nature of the New Law that is written on the 
heart. This task requires him to remove the possibility that the New 
Law in fact undermines law (by promoting antinomianism) without 
turning the New Law into the legalism that characterized the Isra-
elites, “Wherefore the letter, even of the Gospel would kill, unless 
there were the inward presence of the healing grace of faith.”38 His 
exposition of the New Law, as the grace of the Holy Spirit, must 
show what Torrell refers to as the “structural presence” of the Holy 
Spirit—its natural light in this case—and must discourage those 
who think the Holy Spirit “bloweth where it willeth.”39 
Our understanding of Thomas’ task is assisted by noting the 
coincidence of the task of the New Law in instructing human be-
ings and the task of Thomas the teacher in instructing the student. 
Just as the New Law, the grace of the Holy Spirit, teaches, so too 
does the form of any given question in the Summa imitate the dis-
cussion between teacher and student. The form and substance of 
the question unite in a common purpose, “As natural to the mind, 
this process is the nature that the art of teaching imitates, and its 
task is completed when the student within his own mind is holding 
a discourse similar to that which the teacher holds in knowing a 
truth.”40 Disputatio cultivates habits of thought and friendship that 
prepare the student reading the Summa in like manner to how the 
New Law prepares one for the grace of the Holy Spirit: both pre-
pare the intellect and the affections. The disputatio exercises the 
student’s discursive intellect (ratio) and prepares him to perceive 
through intellectus the truth of the question. The disputatio brings 
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the student around to receive the illumination of the natural intel-
lect under the Holy Spirit, but, as Bird observes, the example of 
the teacher leading the student is the necessary component of the 
intellectual process enabling the student to comprehend the truth. 
The embodied relationship of the teacher and the student forms the 
mode of the intellect’s participation in the natural light. The form of 
the Summa presupposes the person of the master is present, not as 
the object taught, but as a non-presence to teach disciples to think 
and live freely.41 Etienne Gilson alludes to this non-presence in his 
observation that the “Summa Theologiae, with its abstract clarity, 
its impersonal transparency, crystallizes before our very eyes and 
for all eternity [Aquinas’s] very interior life.”42
With this in mind, we can see how Q. 106, art. 1, considers how 
the law is instilled in the heart. The Gospel itself is not law, but it 
appeals to the intellect and to the affections, which the Old Law as 
command could not do. In speaking to the intellect, “the Gospel 
contains certain matters pertaining to the manifestation of Christ’s 
Godhead or humanity, which dispose us by means of faith through 
which we receive the grace of the Holy Ghost: and with regard 
to the affections, it contains matters touching the contempt of the 
world.”43 If the New Law is a law, it is a peculiar law. It is the revela-
tion of a person whose life and acts provide the means for fulfi lling 
the law. It is not law so much as, in Brague’s terms, a “regime of sal-
vation”: “The new law is the law of faith, law of liberty. Christ does 
not give that new law, for example, by dictating it in the Sermon on 
the Mount; rather, by making the grace of the Spirit overfl ow on 
the believers who form his mystical body, as communicated by the 
sacraments and in the faith” (LG, 224).
As Brague notes, the New Law provides autonomy through the 
economy of salvation (LG, 223–4), the passage from the Old Law 
to the New. One of the competing viewpoints to which Thomas 
needed to respond was that if the New Law is the law of liberty, 
then do not the standards of the Old Law become obsolete and 
irrelevant in the new era? Will not the new era create an era of 
autonomous agents, “a third state corresponding to the Holy Ghost, 
wherein spiritual men will hold the fi rst place” in possessing the 
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grace of the Holy Spirit more perfectly than ever before?44 This 
is the position of Joachim of Fiore and his followers. Jean-Pierre 
Torrell has noted that the “tenor of this response, as the content 
of the whole of article 4, is naturally addressed against Joachim of 
Flora and his disciples.”45 The Joachite position takes the liberty 
and autonomy of the Christian infused by the Holy Spirit and trans-
ports it to a new level of history, guided by its own intelligentsia. 
Thomas rejects the argument as “foolish,” “senseless,” and “most 
absurd” because it rips apart the Trinity into historical categories. 
The Joachites believed the Holy Spirit had still to descend after the 
Resurrection and Ascension in the form of the Spirit-infused clergy. 
As a result, they believed history, instead of being divided into the 
time of the Old Law and the time of the New Law, has a Trinitarian 
structure: the ages of the Father (Old Law), Son (New Law), and 
Holy Spirit (era of the free spirits).46 Related is Thomas’ concern 
about the antinomianism of the Joachite position. Bearers of the 
Holy Spirit are rules unto themselves, virtuosi (LG, 225–6). For 
Thomas it would be going too far to identify this with the clergy at 
the vanguard of a progressive history (though we have yet to clarify 
what Aquinas regarded as the nature of the virtuosi).
In order to avoid the Joachite historical and antinomian fal-
lacies, Thomas addresses the relationship of the Old Law to the 
New Law in the next question.47 Both share the same end, but the 
New Law is “nearer” to its end. The Old Law is the “law of fear” 
while the New Law is the “law of love.”48 The Old Law restrains the 
hand, while the New Law restrains the will, and so extends to the 
interior acts of sins. He avoids the twofold Joachite fallacy in his 
response to whether the New Law fulfi ls the Old.49 Christ fulfi lled 
the precepts of the Old Law in his works (the person) and doctrine. 
He fulfi lled the Old Law through His doctrine in three ways: 1) 
by extending the prohibitions (e.g., against murder and adultery) to 
acts of the will; 2) by “prescribing the safest way of complying with 
the statutes, that is, by simplifying the prohibitions (e.g., in forbid-
ding perjury, it is safer simply to abstain altogether from swear-
ing, “save in cases of urgency”). This was meant to eliminate the 
legalism that results from adding a maze of exceptions to general 
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rules; 3) by adding “some counsels of perfection.”  The New Law 
only eliminates the Old Law’s ceremonial precepts, which Thomas 
explains as foreshadowing the New Law, which, by completing the 
Old Law, is fi nal, “Thus the promise of a future gift holds no longer 
when it has been fulfi lled by the presentation of the gift. In this way 
the legal ceremonies are abolished by being fulfi lled.”50 As a result 
of this interiorization that also preserves the rational purpose of the 
Old Law, the New Law both lightens the burden by removing some 
precepts, while making it more diffi cult by prohibiting “certain in-
terior movements of the soul” that are most burdensome for those 
lacking in virtue.51 Thus, the New Law is also the “law of liberty” 
because it gives individuals greater discretion as to what they must 
do or avoid.52 Of course, the Sermon on the Mount prescribes right 
interior actions with regard to himself and toward neighbor,53 and 
it maintains the moral precepts of the Old Law because they are 
essential to virtue.54 Even so, it “directs man’s intention” away from 
worldly goods toward beatitude, the “new regime of salvation” ac-
cording to Brague. 
Thomas addresses the “content” of the New Law in the fi nal 
question of the treatise on law. In article 1, he indicates that the 
New Law prescribes few additional external acts, including confes-
sion, because it deals chiefl y with internal acts.55 He also instituted 
sacraments for obtaining grace: Baptism, Eucharist, Holy Orders of 
the ministers of the New Law, Penance, indissoluble Matrimony, 
and Confi rmation.56 Rather, the “Lawgiver” has left most external 
acts to the discretion and love of the believer, and so the New Law 
is called the “law of liberty.”57 The other reason for its being called 
the “law of liberty” is that “the grace of the Holy Spirit is like an 
interior habit bestowed on us and inclining us to act aright, it makes 
us do freely those things that are becoming to grace, and shun what 
is opposed to it.”58 
The New Law directs man’s interior movements toward him-
self and toward his neighbor.59  The fi nal question of the treatise 
on law appropriately deals with Christ’s counsels: “The counsels of 
a wise friend are of great use, according to Prov. xxvii.9: Ointment 
and perfumes rejoice the heart: and the good counsels of a friend 
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rejoice the soul. But Christ is our wisest and greatest friend.”60 The 
commands listed in article 3 are obligations and outline the moral 
struggle that fallen man undergoes to obtain righteousness. The 
counsels, appearing at the conclusion of the treatise on law, im-
ply a degree of perfection on the part of the human being taking 
them, for “a counsel is left to the option of the one to whom it is 
given.” The commands of the New Law “have been given about 
matters that are necessary to gain the end of eternal bliss . . . but 
the counsels are about matters that render the gaining of this end 
more assured and expeditious.” The purpose of the commands and 
counsels are the same, but the counsels are for those more capable 
and willing to seek that end. It follows they are freer, and more 
likely the virtuosi, the closer friends, of God.
The three counsels are 1) perpetual poverty, 2) perpetual chas-
tity, and 3) obedience. The counsels correspond to the three goods 
of the world that perfection rejects: concupiscence of the eyes, 
concupiscence of the fl esh, and the pride of life, which consists 
chiefl y of honors. Of course, as a Dominican, Thomas has in mind 
monastic practice as the form these three counsels of perfection 
take.61 Thomas defended the monastic orders against charges of 
their being parasites on society. 62 Rather, in Contra impugnantes, 
Thomas defends the religious orders as living the apostolic life, 
living as friends of God and evangelizing the world.63 If the New 
Law reveals the person Jesus Christ, then the religious orders liv-
ing out the apostolic life are the best approximation of the law be-
cause they strive to replicate the life of Jesus. They serve as markers 
for the perfect life amidst the fallen saeculum. As such, they serve 
as markers for that space in the saeculum that serves as the entry 
point for human freedom. By accepting the three counsels, they 
lovingly live the New Law by going beyond it, and their vows refl ect 
the reality that transcends the saeculum. If the saeculum is fallen 
and therefore in bondage, by following the counsels they mark the 
space where genuine liberty takes place, and their evangelization, 
including their association with rulers, allows for the saeculum to 
partake in freedom to a fuller extent than before the New Law took 
place.64 
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Thomas does not indicate that they offer policy advice. Rather, 
inspired by charity, they are an “instrument for salvation” for the 
sovereigns they befriend.65 By cautioning them especially against 
the “pride of life” and by offering a positive example of the supe-
riority of the contemplative life infused by caritas over the politi-
cal life, they not only restrain sovereigns and exhort them about 
the limits of servile worldly glory, but also assert the freedom upon 
which the active life draws. Their presence among sovereigns con-
stitutes a reminder of the tension human beings inhabit between 
the saeculum and eternity, and therefore constitutes the locus and 
anchor of their liberty.
Yet, religious orders are not present simply to restrain excessive 
love of worldly honor. Caritas involves love of neighbor, and love 
of God is a special motivation Christians have in practicing justice. 
This is why, for instance, Thomas, unlike Aristotle, treats piety, as 
a gift of the Holy Spirit, as a matter of justice owed toward God 
and not only toward one’s parents as the ancient Greeks had it.66 
Piety motivates Christians to love their neighbor, thereby motivat-
ing a special responsibility to promote justice. Yet, as this article’s 
placement in the Summa suggests, justice is about more than for-
mal rules and procedures, as law, as Brague shows, is more than a 
norm. For Christians, law, and so justice, is a person intending the 
good of irreplaceable and unique individuals. Possibly for this rea-
son, equity (epieikeia), the virtue for judging individual cases whose 
diversity the law is inadequate to handle, is the subject of Q. 120. If 
Christian “divine law” is in fact a person, then equity would be the 
virtue par excellence of the model Christian statesman.67 That such 
a virtue characterizes the model of the Christian statesman and not 
the vast majority of people claiming to be Christian or statesmen 
helps explain Thomas’s reticence in discussing equity as well as the 
general emphasis on the symbol, law, in Christianity.  Moreover, 
as a matter of justice, the practice of equity would be guided by 
the natural light of the Holy Spirit, thus enabling Thomas to show 
how equity, while a special calling for Christian statesmen, is not 
restricted to them, but is available to anyone open to the natural 
light. While the religious orders, whose institutional presence in the 
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courts of the sovereign serves as the presence of the divine law over 
the natural and human law, do not themselves have equity because 
they lack political phronesis, they can motivate those sovereigns 
who do have political phronesis to be specially motivated to prac-
tice justice, which includes equity, and, of course, mercy. 
Even so, members of the religious orders are not necessarily the 
virtuosi and most certainly are not laws unto themselves. Or more 
accurately, not all Dominicans are the virtuosi. The critics of reli-
gious orders to whom Thomas replied in his Apology for Religious 
Orders claimed, among other things, that members of religious or-
ders only put on the appearance of their vows and used their special 
social position to advance their concupiscence, desire for wealth, 
and ambition. These are well-known and historically popular criti-
cisms, which, in the hands of thinkers like Machiavelli and Luther, 
helped to undermine the ancient and medieval understanding of 
political and moral order.68
Thomas was himself enough of a virtuosus to avoid identifying 
the virtuosi with the monastic orders. Human freedom implies that 
human excellence cannot be exhausted by an institution, whether 
political, ecclesiastical, or monastic. Stated more boldly, Thomas 
himself is the virtuosus, the friend of God, at least for his time. He 
was not just a spiritually mature man but the spiritually mature man 
of the Latin Middle Ages; he articulated the exemplary intellectual 
system of the Latin Middle Ages, but he also articulated the great 
synthesis of Western civilization. His “miracle,” as Brague puts it, is 
the Holy Spirit’s gift bestowed on the twin wings of the natural light 
and the light of grace. The work of Thomas explicates the freedom 
and its root upon which the exercise of the speculative intellect but 
also the practical intellect worked in the Middle Ages. The freedom 
that his work explicates sustains the West’s “separation” of church 
and state in general.
Conclusion
Brague’s The Law of God considers the Christian approach to 
divine law in such a way as to force the reader to reconsider not 
only the various ideas and doctrines that Christians up to Thomas 
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Aquinas have elaborated, but also to reconsider how the revelation 
of a person shows the intent of law to be the good of individuals. 
By this, Brague, as well as Paul, Augustine, Aquinas, and others 
Brague mentions, does not regard the human good as private and 
individualistic. Rather, the human good must be thought of as “plu-
rality of persons, all of whom are irreplaceable. Providence must 
thus reach people where they are, which is to say in their variety” 
(LG, 222). By recollecting law as person, Brague points to how one 
needs to think about rejoining law and counsel after they have been 
torn asunder by modernity’s instrumentalization of reason. 
Part of this effort entails working out the priority of phronesis 
to law understood as a norm, and the priority of providentia (which 
intends the good of the individual) under the light of the natural 
light over providentia under the light of grace. Even so, priority in 
a relationship does not mean superiority or that the inferior partner 
is obsolete. Gaining clarity about the nature of law does not entail 
antinomianism. Moreover, the Christian claim of these priorities 
owes their formulations to those symbolizations from which the 
claim springs: the Old Law and Greek philosophy. Divine law in 
Christianity needs to fi nd its partner in the Old Law, not to mention 
in Islam and the other world religions and traditions not covered by 
Brague. Even so, Brague provides guidance in helping us ask the 
right questions.
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